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I. INTRODUCTION

Since the last Federal Black Lung update appeared two years ago,
there have been continuing developments in the interpretation of the
Black Lung Benefits Act' and its implementing regulations.2 This article provides a synopsis of those recent decisions that have a significant
impact on claims adjudicated under the Black Lung Benefits Act
(BLBA). As before,3 the most significant changes are seen in the decisions handed down by the various federal circuit courts of appeals.
II. TRUE DOUBT RULE

The headline issue arising out of claims adjudicated under the
Black Lung Benefits Act provides the greatest scholarly interest and

* Partner, Jackson & Kelly, Morgantown, West Virginia; B.A. 1982, University of
Cincinnati; J.D. 1985, University of Cincinnati. Grateful appreciation is extended to Kathy
L. Snyder, an associate with Jackson & Kelly, Morgantown, for her assistance in research
and suggestions.
1. 30 U.S.C. §§ 901-45 (1988).
2. 20 C.F.R. §§ 400, 718, 725, 727 (1993).
3. William S. Mattingly & Martin E. Hall, Federal Black Lung Update, 94 W. VA.
L. REV. 787 (1992).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1994

1

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 96, Iss. 3 [1994], Art. 11

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 96:819

potential impact on American jurisprudence. This involves the seemingly unpretentious manner of resolving conflicting evidence, which
has become known as the "true doubt" rule. When contrary evidence
submitted by a. claimant and by the party opposing entitlement to
benefits (either a coal mine operator or the Director, Office of
Workers' Compensation Programs) is of equal weight, a true doubt
situation is said to exist. When there is a true doubt as to the resolution of conflicting, but equally probative, evidence in the trier-of-fact's
mind, the Benefits Review Board has consistently upheld the option of
the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) to resolve such doubt in favor of
the claimant.4
Recently, several circuit courts have addressed the validity of fact
finders relying on the true doubt rule, and a split among the circuits
has resulted. Two panels of the Third Circuit5 rejected reliance on the
true doubt rule as violative of the burden of persuasion required by the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA).6 The Sixth7 and Seventh8 Cir-

4. Lessar v. C.F. & I. Steel Corp., 3 Black Lung Rep. 1-63 (1981); Conley v. Roberts and Schaefer Co., 7 Black Lung Rep. 1-309, 1-312 n.4 (1984); Provance v. United
States Steel Corp., I Black Lung Rep. 1-483 (1978).
5. Maher Terminals v. Director, Office of Workers' Comp. Programs and Santoro,
992 F.2d 1277 (3d Cir. 1993), petition for cert. pending, No. 93-740 (filed September 23,
1993); Greenwich Collieries v. Ondecko, 990 F.2d 730 (3d Cir. 1993), sub. nom. Director,
Office of Workers' Comp. Programs v. Greenwich Collieries, petition for cert. pending, No.
93-744 (filed September 23, 1993).
6. Various provisions of the APA are incorporated into the BLBA, 30 U.S.C. §
932(a) (1988), incorporating 33 U.S.C. § 919(a) (1988); see Hillibush v. U.S. Dep't of
Labor, 853 F.2d 197 (3d Cir. 1988); 20 C.F.R. § 725.452(a) (1993).
Section (7)(c) of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (1988) is the provision at issue. It
provides:
Except as. otherwise provided by statute, the proponent of a rule or order has the
burden of proof. Any oral or documentary evidence may be received, but the
agency as a matter of policy shall provide for the exclusion of irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly repetitious evidence. A sanction may not be imposed or rule or
order issued except on consideration of the whole record or those parts thereof
cited by a party and supported by and in accordance with the reliable, probative,
and substantial evidence.
Id.
7. Skukan v. Consol. Coal Co., 993 F.2d 1228 (6th Cir.'1993), cert. pending, No.
93-964.
8. Freeman United Coal Mining Co. v. Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, 988
F.2d 706 (7th Cir. 1993), reh'g denied, 999 F.2d 291 (7th Cir.), cert. pending, No. 93-935
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cuits, however, have embraced the use of true doubt to resolve equally
probative evidence in favor of the claimant when the evidence is believed to be in equipoise or an evidentiary gridlock exists. 9 The Supreme Court of the United States has accepted the writ of criteria filed
by the claimant and Solicitor General in the claims arising out of the
Third Circuit.' °
The differing resolutions of the validity of an ALJ relying on the
true doubt rule will offer the Supreme Court the opportunity to resolve
the split in the circuits. The issue, as framed by the decisions of the
circuits, will weigh the humanitarian or remedial nature of the Act"
against the seemingly clear burden of proof 12 placed on the claimant
as the proponent of an order to award benefits. Although endorsing the
use of the true doubt rule, even the Seventh Circuit acknowledges that
the BLBA contains many substantive and evidentiary rules favorable to
claimants, but no true doubt rule or any facsimile. 13 The Sixth Circuit
has also sent mixed messages. Until Skukan, the Sixth Circuit had
plainly stated that a claimant bears the burden of proving each of the
elements of the claim by a preponderance of the evidence, except
insofar as aided by a presumption.' 4 Inasmuch as the true doubt rule
allows a claimant to prevail on equally probative evidence, the burden
of proof is relaxed.
(filed December 10, 1993).
9. The Fourth Circuit had previously upheld the use of the true doubt rule. See
Adkins v. Director, Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, 958 F.2d 49, 52 (4th Cir. 1992);
Greer v. Director, Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, 940 F.2d 88, 90-91 (4th Cir. 1991).
However, when the validity of the rule was challenged, the Fourth Circuit rejected the reasoning of the Seventh Circuit, but deferred from passing on the validity of the true doubt
principle. Grizzle v. Pickands Mather & Co., 994 F.2d 1093, 1098 n.7 (4th Cir. 1993).
10. Santoro, 992 F.2d 1277, is a claim arising under the Longshore and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1988); Ondecko, 990 F.2d 730, is a
claim arising under the BLBA.
11. Skukan, 993 F.2d at 1236; Freeman, 988 F.2d at 706; Freeman, 999 F.2d at 291.
12. 20 C.F.R. § 718.403 (1993) provides that the burden of proving a fact alleged
shall rest with the party making such allegation.
13. Freeman, 999 F.2d at 292.
14. Adams v. Director, Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, 886 F.2d 818, 820 (6th
Cir. 1989). The Fourth Circuit has similarly held that the standard of proof is a preponderance of the evidence. See also Robinson v. Pickands Mather & Co., 914 F.2d 35, 38 (4th
Cir. 1990) (to be entitled to benefits, a claimant must prove by a preponderance of the
evidence).
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These conflicting decisions provide the Court the chance to clear
the muddled interpretations of the burden of proof placed on the parties by both the BLBA and the APA.15 The Court previously addressed "the burden of proof that the claimant must satisfy to invoke
the presumption," holding that Part 727 requires the claimant to establish at least one of the four qualifying facts by a preponderance of the
evidence.16 Absent specific statutory directives, American jurisprudence has not accepted a standard of proof tolerating "something less
than the weight of the evidence."' 17 Reliance on the true doubt rule
would be a dramatic departure in the standard of proof.
One circuit depicts the Supreme Court as having ducked the opportunity to resolve the burden of proof issue.' The belief that the
Mullins Court ducked the issue seems to stem from footnotes in
Mullins'9 and a perceived tension by some circuit courts in the Supreme Court's decisions in Steadman v. SEC20 and NLRB v. Transportation Management.2 ' In both Steadman and Transportation Management, the Court addresses the burden of proof placed on litigants
by the APA. Despite the contrary discussions of these cases by the
Sixth Circuit in Skukan and Seventh Circuit in Freeman United, commentators 2 have understood a preponderance of the evidence as the

15. Compare the seemingly unrecognizable provisions of 20 C.F.R. § 718.403 (1993),
"Burden of Proof," with § 718.3(c), "Purpose and Intent," and compare 30 U.S.C. § 956
(1988) with 30 U.S.C. § 932(a) (1988), 20 C.F.R. § 725.452(a) (1993).
16. Mullins Coal Co. v. Director, Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, 484 U.S. 135,
138 (1987). In Mullins, the Court considered a claim filed prior to April 1, 1980, and considered under the criteria at 20 C.F.R. § 727. Here, miners with at least ten years of coal
mine employment are entitled to a rebuttable presumption of total disability due to pneumoconiosis, if they can establish the existence of pneumoconiosis, laboratory studies indicat-

ing a pulmonary impairment, or a physician's assessment of pulmonary disability.
17. Charlton v. FrC, 543 F.2d 903, 907 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
18. Freeman, 999 F.2d at 292.
19. Mullins, 484 U.S. at 156 n.29, 161 n.35.
20. Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91 (1981).
21. NLRB v. Transp. Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393 (1983). See also Herman &
MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375 (1983) (addressing the burden of proof required by
the APA).
22. BERNARD SCHWARTZ, ADMISTRATIVE LAW, § 7.9 (3d ed. 1991).
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burden of persuasion enunciated in Steadman v. SEC and required by
section 556 of the APA.23
Whether or not the BLBA and the APA allow a party to prove its
case by less than a preponderance of the evidence or require a preponderance of the evidence to prevail should be resolved by the summer
of 1994. The potential impact of the Court's decision will be shaped
by however narrowly or broadly the Court defines the issue it must

decide. Yet the seemingly apt concession by a panel of the Seventh
Circuit 24

that the true doubt rule is a judicial attempt to reconstruct a
presumption'no longer available 5 seems to ring true.
III. BuRDEN OF PROOF FOR SURVIVOR'S CLAIMS FILED
ON OR AFrER JANUARY 1, 1982

Survivors of miners are provided benefits when a miner's death
was due to pneumoconiosis.26 For claims filed on or after January 1,
1982, "death will be considered due to pneumoconiosis if... pneumoconiosis was a substantially contributing cause or factor leading to
the miner's death or where the death was caused by complications of
pneumoconiosis." 27 Several circuits have addressed whether or not
this standard allows benefits when pneumoconiosis is not found to be
a proximate cause of death, yet had some tangible effect in death. In
four separate decisions, 8 ALJs considered the evidence and ruled that
pneumoconiosis was not a cause or factor leading to death since pneumoconiosis was not the proximal cause of death.29 Three of the four

23. 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (1988).
24. Freeman, 999 F.2d at 293.
25. The presumption of total disability due to pneumoconiosis is available only for
claims filed prior to March 31, 1980. After that date, the regulations require a claimant to
prove the existence of pneumoconiosis and disability causation in all but very few instances.
See 20 C.F.R. § 718.305 (1993).
26. 20 C.F.R. § 718.205(a) (1993).
27. 20 C.F.R. § 718.205(c)(2) (1993).
28. Brown v. Rock Creek Mining Co., 996 F.2d 812 (6th Cir. 1993); Shuff v. Cedar
Creek Coal Co., 967 F.2d 977, 979 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 969 (1993);
Peabody Coal Co. v. Railey, 972 F.2d 178 (7th Cir. 1992); Lukosevicz v. Director, Office
of Workers' Compensation Programs, 888 F.2d 1001 (3d Cir. 1989).
29. In Brown, the ALJ denied the widow's claim and ruled that pneumoconiosis had
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decisions were reversed when considered at the circuit level.30 In the
fourth case, a denial of widow's benefits was vacated, and the case
remanded for reconsideration. 3 1 Recently, the Sixth Circuit embraced
the reasoning in the other circuit court decisions, adopting the standard
that pneumoconiosis is a "substantially contributing cause or factor" of
a miner's death when pneumoconiosis has actually hastened death.32
The Third Circuit was the first of the circuits to grapple with the
question of what "substantially contributing cause or factor" meant. In
a decision issued in 1989, 33 a panel of the Third Circuit directed an
award of benefits where the primary cause of death was pancreatic
cancer clearly unrelated to pneumoconiosis, but pneumoconiosis was
believed to have hastened, albeit briefly, death.34 The Fourth Circuit
adopted the same legal standard, holding that pneumoconiosis substantially contributes to death if pneumoconiosis serves to hasten death in
any way. 35 The Seventh Circuit joined in this interpretation of what
constitutes a substantially contributing cause. 36 While such an interpretation of "substantially contributing cause" has been supported by
the Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, and now
adopted by the four circuits, at least one circuit judge has dissented,
raising valid questions about the reasoning underlying the analysis of
the standard in Lukosevicz and its progeny.
The dissenting voice in Brown, Circuit Judge Batchelder, questions
the majority's reasoning on three fronts. The dissent challenges: (1)

not been a substantial cause in death primarily caused by acute ventricular fibrillation. 996
F.2d 812. In Lukosevicz, the ALJ denied the widow's claim where pancreatic cancer, unrelated to pneumoconiosis, was the primary cause of death. 888 F.2d 1001. In Shuff, the court
reversed the finding that death was primarily due to the effects of pancreatic cancer and
held pneumoconiosis hastened death as it made the miner more susceptible to pneumonia.
967 F.2d 977. In Peabody, the Seventh Circuit remanded for consideration of the evidence
and determine whether pneumoconiosis played a role in death primarily due to bronchogenic
carcinoma. 972 F.2d 178.
30. Lukosevicz, 888 F.2d 1001; Shuff, 967 F.2d 977; Brown, 996 F.2d 812.
31. Peabody, 972 F.2d 178.
32. Brown, 996 F.2d 812.
33. Lukosevicz, 888 F.2d 1001.
34. Id. at 1004.
35. Shuff, 967 F.2d at 979.
36. Peabody, 972 F.2d at 183.
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whether an interpretation of "substantially contributing cause" is warranted; (2) whether the majority errs in adopting the Director's recommended interpretation of "substantially contributing cause"; and (3)
whether the case should be remanded for further consideration by the
ALJ, rather than reversed. 37 As the dissent first points out, the ALJ
who considered the facts failed to correctly identify the legal standard
38
to apply.
The ALJ analyzed the evidence under a standard requiring that death
be due to or "significantly caused" by pneumoconiosis, rather than
whether pneumoconiosis was a "substantially contributing cause" of
death. The court had no need to interpret the meaning of the pertinent
legal standard since the ALJ erred in identifying the standard to apply.
The case should have been remanded for the ALJ to consider if pneumoconiosis was a substantially contributing cause of death.
Second, since the claim should have been remanded, the consideration of the Director's interpretation of "substantially contributing
cause" or the decision to defer to the Director in ascertaining the
meaning of the standard was unnecessary.39 As the dissent correctly
points out, even if addressed, the meaning of "substantially contributing cause" is not ambiguous. 40 Accordingly, the Director is worthy of
no special deference in the interpretation of the meaning of the standard.41 Instead of conducting needless and unsupported excursions
into legislative history, the ALJ could have been left to "consult any
dictionary for guidance, and after that it is our [circuit court's] job
simply to see if the conclusion drawn by the ALJ is supported by
substantial evidence." 42

37. Brown, 996 F.2d at 817.

38. Id.
39. Id. at 818.
40. Id.
41. Judicial deference to an administrative agency's interpretation of ambiguous provisions of the statutes it is authorized to implement can be proper. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Counsel, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984); see also Pauley v.
BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2524, 2534 (1991) (for a discussion of whether the
Court need defer to the Director's interpretation of the regulations).
42. Brown, 996 F.2d at 818.
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Finally, the dissent questions the majority's conclusion that the
evidence was "abundantly clear" so as to require the circuit court to
order that benefits be awarded.43 The circuit court is in a very poor
position to weigh conflicting evidence and only in the exceptional case
should the court reverse the AL's finding with instructions to award
or deny benefits. 44 Nevertheless, the majority reversed the ALJ's denial of benefits.
While all of the dissent's criticisms are valid, there would appear
little chance to alter the predominant interpretation of "substantial
contributing cause." The result of the prevailing interpretation of the
standard to establish entitlement to survivor's benefits has diminished
the claimant's burden of proof, in much the same way that the meaning of disability is due to pneumoconiosis was judicially reduced so as
to allow entitlement if pneumoconiosis was at least in part responsible
45
for disability.
IV.

MORE RECENT EVIDENCE-MORE PROBATIVE OR NOT?

For many years, Administrative Law Judges have been asked to
resolve starkly conflicting medical evidence in black lung claims. Confficts frequently (almost predictably) arise among physicians' assessments as to the existence of pneumoconiosis or in the assessment of
degree of pulmonary disability arising out of coal mine dust induced
lung disease.46 In weighing conflicting medical opinions, ALJs fre43. Id.
44. Id. at 819.
45. Adams v. Director, Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, 886 F.2d 818 (6th Cir.
1989); Mangus v. Director, Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, 882 F.2d 1527 (10th Cir.
1989) (holding if pneumoconiosis is at least a contributing cause, then there is a significant
nexus between pneumoconiosis and the total disability to satisfy the burden of proof); see
also Robinson v. Pickands Mather & Co./Leslie Coal Co., 914 F.2d 35 (4th Cir. 1990);
Shelton v. Director, Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, 899 F.2d 690 (7th Cir. 1990);
Contra Lollar v. Alabama By-Products Corp., 893 F.2d 1258 (11th Cir. 1990); Bonessa v.
U.S. Steel Corp., 884 F.2d 726 (3d Cir. 1989).
46. To prevail in a BLBA claim filed since 1982, a miner must prove four distinct
elements: (1) the existence of pneumoconiosis; (2) pneumoconiosis arose out of coal mine
employment; (3) that there is a totally disabling pulmonary impairment; and (4) that the
pulmonary impairment was caused, in part, by coal mine employment. Newell v. Director,
Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, 933, F.2d 510 (7th Cir. 1991).
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quently look to the more recent medical reports as more probative of a
miner's current condition. This practice of according deference to later
evidence, dubbed the "later evidence rule," seemed especially apt in
evaluating black lung claims, as coal workers' pneumoconiosis is considered to be a progressive and irreversible disease.47 To resolve conflicting medical evidence, the Benefits Review Board has upheld the
determination to accord added weight to more recent evidence, especially when a significant amount of time separates the newer from the
older evidence.48 While it is reasonable to place greater weight on
more recent evidence, ALJs were not to mechanically credit later evidence to resolve conflicting evidence.49
Against this background, the Fourth Circuit considered a decision
where the ALJ found more recent x-ray interpretations more probative
and denied benefits." Unlike many black lung claims, there was
sparse medical evidence presented for consideration. The pertinent
evidence consisted of three x-rays and a single physician's interpretation of each x-ray. The earliest chest x-ray was taken in 1982 and
interpreted to reveal changes consistent with simple and complicated
coal workers' pneumoconiosis 1 Subsequent radiographs taken in
1983 and 1984 were interpreted by two other physicians as compatible

47. The BLBA defines coal workers' pneumoconiosis at 30 U.S.C. § 902(b) (1988) as
a chronic dust disease of the lung. According to the Surgeon General, coal workers' pneumoconiosis is irreversible and progressive. Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1,
7 (1976).
48. Numerous decisions of the Benefits Review Board have upheld ALJs' use of the
later evidence rule. See, e.g., Wetzel v. Director, Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, 8
Black Lung Rep. 1-139 (1985); Edwards v. Director, Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, 6
Black Lung Rep., 1-265 (1983); Stanley v. Director, Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, 7
Black Lung Rep., 1-386 (1984). For a listing of later evidence cases see BLACK LUNG
DESKBOOK, BLACK LUNG REP., Vol. A, Part IV, 3(c), at A6-308.
49. Keen v. Jewel Ridge Coal Corp., 6 Black Lung Rep. 1-454 (1983).
50. Adkins v. Director, Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, 958 F.2d 49 (4th Cir.
1992).
51. Simple pneumoconiosis is defined as radiographic opacities ranging from 1.5 millimeters to 10 millimeters as defined by the ILO/UICC classification system. See 20 C.F.R.
§ 718.103 (1993). Complicated pneumoconiosis produces radiographic opacities in excess of
10 millimeters in diameter identified as large opacities of size A, B, or C in the ILOIUICC
system. See 20 C.F.R. § 718.304. When proven, complicated coal workers' pneumoconiosis
invokes an "irrebuttable" presumption of entitlement. See 30 U.S.C. § 923(b)(2) (1988); 20
C.F.R. § 718.304 (1993).
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with a much lower profusion of simple pneumoconiosis without any
changes diagnostic of complicated coal workers' pneumoconiosis. All
three of the physicians were certified as B-readers of x-rays, while the
earlier chest x-ray had been interpreted by a physician also board
certified by the American College of Radiology.5 2 The AD determined that the interpretations of the later x-rays from 1983 and 1984
outweighed the reading of the older x-ray. Faced with conflicting evidence as to the existence of complicated coal workers' pneumoconiosis, the ALJ ruled that the x-ray evidence as a whole was insufficient
to prove the existence of complicated coal workers' pneumoconiosis.
When asked to review this resolution of the conflicting x-ray evidence,
the circuit panel concluded that the "later evidence is better rationale"
has no logical force.5 3 The court flatly rejected the approach as a valid means to reconcile evidence that cannot be reconciled by reference
to its sequence.
In a nutshell, the three-judge panel described the later evidence
rule as a theory premised on: (1) pneumoconiosis is a progressive disease; (2) claimants cannot get better; and (3) a later test or exam is a
more reliable indicator of the miner's condition than an earlier one.
That logic only holds where the evidence is consistent with premises 1
and 2. If the evidence shows the miner has improved, the reasoning
underlying the later is better rule does not apply.54
Without the
sion to find the
entitled to equal
ing the Benefits

underpinnings of the later is better principle, the deci"more qualified" radiologist's x-ray interpretation not
or greater weight was deemed "unreasoned." RemindReview Board and Administrative Law Judges55 that

52. B-readers are physicians who have demonstrated a proficiency in interpreting chest
radiographs for the presence or absence of pneumoconiosis and have done so by passing an
examination given by the Appalachian Laboratory for Occupational Safety and Health. See

42 C.F.R. § 37.51(b) (1993); 20 C.F.R. § 718.202(a)(1)(ii)(E) (1993).
53. Adkins, 958 F.2d at 51.
54. Id. at 52.
55. Claims brought under the Black Lung Benefits Act are adjudicated by Administrative Law Judges and then reviewed by the United States Department of Labor's Benefits
Review Board. Parties are accorded review by the federal circuit court wherein the injury
occurred. See 33 U.S.C. § 921 (1988).
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the Act embodies the principle "that doubt is to be resolved in favor
of the claimant," the court reversed the denial of benefits. 6
Instrumental, if not outcome determinative, in this panel's decision
may have been the characterization that the conflict was one regarding
the severity of coal workers' pneumoconiosis rather than a conflict
concerning the existence of the disease.57 Although this miner had
radiographic evidence of pneumoconiosis, the decision to reverse the
ALJ's denial of benefits is troubling for several reasons. First, this
panel departs from the circuit's own long standing stated standard of
review. While repeating the standard of review, requiring determinations below to be upheld if rational and supported by substantial evidence,58 the panel departs from that standard. In reviewing an ALJ's
factual findings, a circuit court does not have the authority to re-weigh
and resolve conflicting evidence, but is to determine if the decision
below is supported by substantial evidence. 9 Yet, this panel engages
in re-weighing the conflicting x-ray evidence. While the 1982 chest xray was read by a radiologist, two subsequent physicians 60 interpreted
separate chest x-rays, independently concluding there was a strikingly
lesser degree of the disease present.6 1 Applying the standard of review, the resolution of this question of fact is exclusively reserved for
the ALl as the trier-of-fact. As the Supreme Court has taught, "the
ALl's task is, of course, to weigh the quality, and not just the quanti-

56. The assertion that the Black Lung Benefits Act embodies the principle that doubt
is to be resolved in favor of the claimant is not embodied in the language of the Black
Lung Benefits Act, the implementing regulations, or statutory provisions of the Longshore
and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act. See supra part II. Nevertheless the "humanitarian"
purpose of the Act has become part and parcel of the lore surrounding federal black lung

claims.
57. Adkins, 958 F.2d at 52.
58. Napier v. Director, Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, 890 F.2d 669, 672 (4th

Cir. 1989).
59. The standard of review is provided at 33 U.S.C. § 921 (1988).
60. Both of whom were qualified as NIOSH-certified B-readers but not Board-certified
in radiology.
61. The 1980 x-ray was classified as revealing complicated pneumoconiosis category A
large opacities and a background of small opacities of 2/3. Later x-rays were described to
evidence only small opacities of a 1/0 profusion. Adkins, 958 F.2d at 51.
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ty, of the evidence., 62 The proper course was to remand, not reweigh,
the conflicting evidence.63
The logic is further muddled with the reminder addressed to the
Benefits Review Board and Administrative Law Judges that the Act
embodies "humanitarian principles." 64 Humanitarian in scope or not,
the opinions of two physicians who each reviewed a later chest radiograph can rationally be found more persuasive than one physician who
believed an earlier radiograph showed a much more advanced form of
disease. Reasonable minds would agree.65 In reversing the denial of
benefits, the panel falls prey to the same empty logic it attacks. Mechanical deference based on "superior credentials," much like later
evidence, is devoid of persuasive logic.
An alternative to one doctor being "right," while the two other
physicians were "wrong," is possible. Radiographic opacities on a chest
x-ray may be consistent with coal workers' pneumoconiosis. 6 If the
densities disappear, they are not the permanent scarring and fibrosis
associated with coal workers' pneumoconiosis. Thus, it is possible that
the physician correctly identified abnormalities apparent in 1982, but
since the radiographic changes were a result of an acute infection or
inflammatory disease that subsequently disappeared, the later x-rays
failed to manifest such changes. Yet, this is a question for a trier-offact, not for an appellate tribunal, to attempt to weigh and resolve.
The third, and perhaps most troubling, aspect of this decision is
the suggestion that x-rays taken subsequent to an x-ray read positive
for pneumoconiosis have no probative value when interpreted as revealing a lesser degree of pneumoconiosis. If such is to be the holding
in Adkins, both the Director and coal mine operators are put at a tremendous and irrational disadvantage. Should a physician interpret a
62. Mullins, 484 U.S. at 149 n.23.

63. See Thom v. Itmann Coal Co., 3 F.3d 713 (4th Cir. 1993).
64. Adkins, 958 F.2d at 52.
65. Whether reasonable minds would agree is the standard employed in weighing decisions below. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971).
66. 20 C.F.R. § 718.102(b) (1993) adopts the ILO/UICC classification system for
radiographic opacities relating to coal workers' pneumoconiosis. The classification scheme
provides that shadows seen on a chest x-ray may be "consistent with" coal workers' pneumoconiosis.
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radiograph as positive for pneumoconiosis and is simply wrong, subsequent x-rays interpreted by equally qualified physicians might be accorded no weight given the assumption underlying the Adkins holding
that once some physician appreciates pneumoconiosis it must be present. Such a result is just as irrational as the later is better principle
that the court attacks.
Had the AL mechanically credited the more recent x-ray interpretations over the earlier interpretation given the sequence alone, the
panel would have been correct to vacate the finding. 67 Yet, from the
portion of the ALl's decision quoted, this does not seem to have been
the case. The ALJ held that the positive
finding was disputed by two findings of simple pneumoconiosis on two
subsequent x-rays. Since pneumoconiosis is progressive and since there are
two findings of simple pneumoconiosis on two subsequent x-rays, I reject
[the finding of complicated pneumoconiosis]l.

The trier-of-fact concluded that the positive reading of complicated
pneumoconiosis was errant. The ALJ did not mechanically hold that
the interpretation of complicated pneumoconiosis was based on evidence that was "old" and therefore irrelevant.
A subsequent unpublished decision by the same circuit ruled that
the currency of a medical report is an appropriate consideration in the
balancing of medical reports.6 9 While unpublished, this panel retreats
from the overly broad suggestion that later is better is always irrational. Prior decisions of this same circuit have held that more recent
blood gas studies are more indicative of a claimant's pulmonary
health.70 Other circuits have affirmed a determination that more recent

67. The Benefits Review Board has discouraged such a mechanical analysis of conflicting evidence for years. Keen v. Jewell Ridge Coal Corp., 6 Black Lung Rep. 1-454
(1983).
68. Adkins, 958 F.2d at 51.
69. Stanley v. Director, Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, 17 Black Lung Rep.,
No. 92-1453 (4th Cir. 1993). Unpublished opinions by the United States Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit do not serve as precedent.
70. Gray v. Director, Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, 943 F.2d 513 (4th Cir.
1990).
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evidence warrants greater deference.7 ALJs certainly should consider
the temporal proximity of conflicting test results in determining which
of the two different medical opinions to credit.72
A panel of an adjoining circuit joined in rejecting later evidence.73 In Woodward, the ALJ was ruled to have misapplied the
"later evidence" principle. The ALJ considered only the later x-rays,
not seeking to reconcile the positive results of earlier x-rays with the
negative interpretations of the later x-ray interpretations. The mechanical use of later evidence to resolve conflicting x-ray interpretations is
irrational and prohibited.74
The same circuit has retreated from the potentiality of an overly
broad holding of Adkins in a published decision. 75 The court held:
In Adkins v. Director, OWCP, we struck down, as arbitrary and irrational, the practice of blindly ascribing more weight to the most recent
evidence.
The employer argues that a recent physician's opinion can be more
reliable than an old one. Of course it can be. There may be new or additional evidence developed that discredits an earlier opinion; a comparison
of medical reports and tests over a long period may conceivably provide a
physician with a better perspective than the pioneer examiner. The reasons
for crediting such an opinion could be perfectly rational. But "recency," in
and of itself, is not one of those reasons. A bare appeal to "recency" is an
abdication of rational decisionmaking.76

In about one year, the courts suggested a vast departure from the
weighing of conflicting medical evidence. After suggesting a departure,
at least the Fourth Circuit has deferred to embrace the Benefits Review
Board's prior resolution of the tension in conflicting evidence. Reliance
on more recent evidence is permissible, but mechanical deference
based on date alone is irrational, and prohibited. An ALJ can credit

71. Robinson v. Missouri Mining Co., 955 F.2d 1181, 1183-84 (8th Cir. 1992).
72. Mullins Coal Co. v. Director, Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, 484 U.S. 135,
151-52 (1987); Island Creek Coal Co. v. Cooley, 845 F.2d. 622 (6th Cir. 1988).
73. Woodward v. Director, Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, 991 F.2d 314 (6th
Cir. 1993).
74. Id. at 320-21.
75. Thorn, 3 F.3d at 718.
76. Id. (citation omitted).
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more recent evidence, not just because it is more recent, but because
the evidence fails to support a claimant's entitlement to benefits, based
on the presence of pneumoconiosis or pulmonary disability.
V. REBuTrAL OF THE INTERiM PRESUMIuON
Despite having been promulgated and applied for nearly one decade and a half, circuit courts are still trying to attach meaning to the
rebuttal provisions of the interim presumption.77 Courts have struggled
with the meaning of 20 C.F.R. section 727.203(b)(2) and whether it
encompasses only pulmonary or whole-man disability. s At least one
circuit court has now struggled with the meaning of the seemingly
clear language of 20 C.F.R. § 727.203(b)(3).7 9
In what, at least until now, was deceptively clear language, subsection (b)(3) provides the presumption of disability due to pneumoconiosis shall be rebutted if "[t]he evidence establishes that the total disability or death of the miner did not arise in whole or in part out of
80
coal mine employment.
The disability referred to in subsection (b)(3) is that disability presumed in section 727 subpart A, a pulmonary disability." The BLBA
confers disability benefits on coal miners or their families as prolonged
exposure to coal dust has subjected hundreds of thousands of coal
miners to pneumoconiosis-a serious and progressive condition. 2 For
nearly a decade, the prevailing standard has required the party oppos-

77. The interim presumption affords long term miners with evidence of a pulmonary
impairment or pneumoconiosis with the presumption of disability due to coal workers' pneumoconiosis, 20 C.F.R. § 727.203(a) (1993). Employers can rebut this under any of four
methods described at 20 C.F.R. § 727.203(b) (1993).
78. E.g., Martin v. Alabama By-Products Corp., 864 F.2d 1555 (11th Cir. 1989);
Sykes v. Director, Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, 812 F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1987); York
v. Benefits Review Board, 819 F.2d 134 (6th Cir. 1987); Wetherill v. Director, Office of
Workers' Comp. Programs, 812 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1987); Kertesz v. Crescent Hills Coal
Co., 788 F.2d 158 (3d Cir. 1986).
79. Cort v. Director, Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, 996 F.2d 1549 (3d Cir.

1993).
80. 20 C.F.R. § 727.203(b)(3) (1993).
81. 20 C.F.R. § 727.1(a) (1993).
82. Mullins, 484 U.S. at 138.
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ing entitlement to "rule out" any relationship between the miner's
disability and coal mine employment.83 The rule out standard requires
a party to establish that the miner's primary condition (usually understood to be of pulmonary origin) was not aggravated to the point of
total disability by prolonged exposure to coal dust. 4 This interpretation of subsection (b)(3) seemed settled. An illustrative example is
helpful. A retired coal miner, with an x-ray positive for simple pneumoconiosis, is disabled due to a non-occupationally caused stroke.
Rebuttal under subsections (b)(1), (b)(2), and (b)(4) is not possible
because of the x-ray evidence of pneumoconiosis and the debilitating
effects of the stroke. However, if there was "no pulmonary impairment" the claim would be properly denied as the disability, due to a
stroke, was not a pulmonary impairment due to pneumoconiosis. The
presumption of total disability due to pneumoconiosis should be rebutted because pneumoconiosis causes a pulmonary impairment and the
evidence shows no pulmonary impairment. Thus, the evidence "rules
out" total disability arising out of coal mine employment. The Benefits
Review Board embraced such a use of (b)(3) rebuttal."
In a June 1993 decision, the Third Circuit rejected such an understanding of the meaning of (b)(3) rebuttal, by showing that a claimant
has no respiratory or other pulmonary impairment.86 Subsection (b)(3)
was deemed as limited to concerning whether the claimant's total
disability results in whole, or in part, from coal mine employment.87
Subsection (b)(3) is limited to those instances where disability was

83. The rule out standard has been adopted by several circuits. E.g., Rosebud Coal
Sales Co. v. Weigand, 831 F.2d 926 (10th Cir. 1987); Palmer Coking Coal Co. v. Director,
Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, 720 F.2d 1054 (9th Cir. 1983). Several circuits require
that pneumoconiosis not be a contributing cause to the disability. Consolidation Coal Co. v.
Smith, 837 F.2d 321 (8th Cir. 1988); Wetherill v. Director, Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, 812 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1987); Carozza v. U.S. Steel Corp., 727 F.2d 74 (3d Cir.

1984).
84. Phillips v. Jewell Ridge Coal Co., 10 Black Lung Rep. 2-160, affd, 825 F.2d 408

(4th Cir. 1987).
85. Marcum v. Director, Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, 11 Black Lung Rep. I23 (1987).
86. Cort, 996 F.2d at 1551-53.
87. Id. at 1552.
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caused by some other disease, 8 addressing the source not the degree
89
of disability.
The ALJ had ruled that because the miner had "no impairment,"
there was not total disability due to coal mine employment and rebuttal established via subsection (b)(3). While acknowledging the obvious
logic in the ALl's reasoning, it was believed to "subvert" the "carefully structured" rebuttal scheme of 20 C.F.R. § 727.203(b). 90 The
change in the interpretation of subsection (b)(3) strikes out at a perceived injustice. In considering Cort's claim, the ALJ had initially
ruled that the presumption of disability due to pneumoconiosis had
been rebutted under subsection (b)(2) 91 because the miner, had "no
impairment." The Benefits Review Board vacated this finding as a
medical opinion of "no impairment" was insufficient to establish that a
miner is "able to do his usual coal mine or comparable and gainful
work.' 92 The ALJ was perceived as trying to evade the impact of a
prior decision by squeezing the same bit of reasoning (no impairment
ergo no total disability) into subsection (b)(3). 93 Rebuttal under subsection (b)(3) was limited to addressing the source of the disability;

88. Bemardo v. Director, Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, 790 F.2d 351, 353 (3d
Cir. 1986).
89. Kertesz v. Crescent Hills Coal Co., 788 F.2d 158, 162 n.5 (3d Cir. 1986).
90. Cort, 996 F.2d at 1552. This is the same "carefully structured" scheme described
in Supreme Court decisions as "byzantine," "impenetrable," or as the result of "scrivener's
error" and which has so far warranted three trips to the United States Supreme Court to
resolve conflicting interpretations of the carefully structured criteria- Pauley v. BethEnergy
Mines, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2524, 2535 (1991); Pittston Coal Group v. Sebben, 488 U.S. 105,
129 (1988) (Stevens, J., dissenting in part); Mullins Coal Co. v. Director, Office of
Workers' Comp. Programs, 484 U.S. 135 (1987).
91. 20 C.F.R. § 727.203(b)(2) (1993) provides that the presumption shall be rebutted
if "in light of all relevant evidence it is established that the individual is able to do his
usual coal mine work or comparable and gainful work (see § 401.412(a)(1) of this title)."
92. Gonzales v. Director, Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, 869 F.2d 776, 779 (3d
Cir. 1989) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 727.203(b)(2)). For nearly a decade the parties read subsection (b)(2) to include only considerations of pulmonary or respiratory disability. Sykes v.
Itmann Coal Co., 2 Black Lung Rep. 1-1089 (1980). This came to a halt in the circuit.
See, e.g., Sykes v. Director, Office of Workers' Comp., 812 F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1987); York
v. Benefits Review Board, 819 F.2d 134 (6th Cir. 1987); Kertesz v. Crescent Hills Coal
Co., 788 F.2d 158 (3d Cir. 1986).
93. Cort, 996 F.2d at 1552.
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rebuttal regarding the existence of total disability must proceed only
under the rubric of subsection (b)(1) or (b)(2).
Such an interpretation of the rebuttal scheme is not only needlessly restrictive, but illogical. Such an interpretation deprives a party
opposing benefits of the opportunity to efficiently rebut the presumed
existence of pulmonary disability arising out of coal mine employment.
A party opposing entitlement must be allowed to rebut the presumption
of total disability due to pneumoconiosis by proving that the miner has
no pneumoconiosis, has no pulmonary impairment, or is not disabled
from performing the usual coal mine employment.94
Confusion over the meaning of "impairment" versus "disability"
adds another layer of confusion to the analysis.9 If the miner retired
15 years ago and has now reached the age of 80, he cannot do the
exertional labors required in underground coal mining. The rule suggested in Cort prohibits an employer from rebutting the presumption of
disability due to pneumoconiosis by showing that there is no impairment arising out of coal mine employment by proving no pulmonary
impairment.
Disability benefits are payable when a miner is totally disabled,
the disability was caused at least in part by pneumoconiosis, and the
disability arose out of coal mine employment.96 In enacting the
BLBA, Congress expressed a concern with the insidious effects of the
work environment on a coal miner's health. But if a miner is not
actually suffering from the type of impairment with which Congress
was concerned, there is no justification for presuming that the miner is
entitled to benefits. There needs to be a logical connection between the
proven fact and the presumed conclusion to satisfy the constitutional
concern that there is some rational connection between the fact proved
94. Pauley, 111 S. Ct. at 2539.
95. While seemingly synonymous, disability is a legal concept and. impairment is a
medical concept. By way of analogy, if a ballet dancer loses a leg, the impairment (loss of
a leg) is totally disabling; it forever prevents the dancer from dancing as before. If a bureaucrat suffers the same injury, the degree of impairment does not hamper the ability to
work at a desk. There is the same impairment, but no accompanying disability. In fact, as
the worker may be forced to stick close by the desk, an advancement may result. KEITH
W. MORGAN, OCCUPATIONAL LUNG DISEASES 63 (2d ed. 1984).
96. Mullins, 484 U.S. at 141.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol96/iss3/11

18

Mattingly: Federal Black Lung Update

19941

FEDERAL BLACK LUNG UPDATE

and the ultimate fact presumed.97 It disserves congressional intent to
interpret Health, Education and Welfare's interim regulations to allow
recovery by miners who do not have pneumoconiosis or whose total
disability did not arise, at least in part, from their coal mine employ98
ment.
The holding in Cort allows applicants with no pulmonary or respiratory disability to be shielded from rebuttal evidence proving there is
neither impairment nor disability arising out of coal mine employment.
A party opposing entitlement may not be able to show that the miner
is able to do his usual work, but there may be no medical impairment
or legal disability. The standard in Cort undermines the intent of the
rebuttal criteria and deprives, without justification, either the Department of Labor or a coal mine operator of the ability to construct a
defense based on the notion that there is no compensable disability
when no pulmonary impairment exists.99
VI. DUTY TO NAME RESPONSIBLE OPERATORS
The regulations provide that at the initial stage of a claim, the
District Director is to identify and name the potential responsible operators.'0 In 1984, the Benefits Review Board ruled that this task must
be correctly performed prior to a formal hearing before an AL. 1 01
The Director was not entitled to another opportunity to identify other
putative responsible operators. This decision was interpreted to prohibit
the remanding of claims by an ALJ for further exploration of the
responsible operator issue. Once referred to the ALJ for a hearing, the
Director was limited to the pool of operators named to select the ultimate responsible operator. The Sixth Circuit limited such a broad
interpretation, holding in situations where a hearing had not been held,
the Director was not prohibited from naming a new responsible opera-

97. Id. at 158-59.
98. Id. at 159.
99. As an aside, it is interesting to note that the Director's interpretation of the regulations was not found to be entitled to any special deference as the court believed it was
"not reasonable" and "cannot be sustained." Cort, 996 F.2d at 1551-52 n.6.
100. 20 C.F.R. § 725.412 (1993).
101. Crabtree v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 7 Black Lung Rep. 1-354 (1984).
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tor after an earlier operator had been dismissed. 1°2 In this case, the
ALJ had dismissed the alternative responsible operator after the District
Director had failed to name the party "as soon after the filing of the
claim as the evidence allowed."' 0 3 The Sixth Circuit was not persuaded to extend the Crabtree doctrine to such situations.
Since the issuance of Crabtree, the Director routinely names all
potential responsible operators in the initial proceedings and retains the
multiple operators as potential parties when a black lung claim is
forwarded to the Office of Administrative Law Judges. While the
implementing regulations for the BLBA clearly extend liability for the
payment of black lung benefits to officers and directors of coal mine
operators, 1°4 the Department seems reluctant to proceed against a primary responsible operator or its officers or directors when the operator
is out of business. Rather, the Department of Labor routinely names all
or any potential responsible operators (all employers since January
1970) in an attempt to proceed against those that either have insurance
for the payment of black lung benefits or are still financially viable
coal producers. Such alternative naming of operators is incorrect." 5
The scope and intent section of the subpart providing the criteria for
the naming of responsible operators '6 specifically contemplates the
Black Lung Disability Trust Fund to pay benefits if the responsible
operator is in default. 0 7
No authority exists in the BLBA or the implementing regulations
for an alternative responsible operator, absent successor operators, to
affirmatively establish that another potential operator has the ability to
pay benefits if found liable.'0 8 The Director has no authority to shift

102. Director, Office of Workers' Comp. Programs v. Oglebay Norton Co., 877 F.2d
1300 (6th Cir. 1989) (narrowing Crabtree v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 7 Black Lung Rep. 1354), rev'd and remanded; Goddard v. Oglebay Norton Co., 12 Black Lung Rep. 1-130

(1988).
103.

Oglebay Norton, 877 F.2d at 1302.

104. 20 C.F.R. § 725.494-.495 (1993); Donovan v. McKee, 669 F. Supp 138 (S.D.
W.Va. 1987), aft'd, 845 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1988).
105. England v. Island Creek Coal Company, 17 Black Lung Rep. 1-141 (1993).
106. Subpart F to Part 725, 20 C.F.R. §§ 725.490 to -.497 (1993).

107. 20 C.F.R. § 725.490(a) (1993).
108. England, 17 Black Lung Rep. at 1-144.
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the burden of proof on another potential responsible operator to demonstrate the ability of another operator to assume payment. Rather, an
alternative operator need only show that the primary operator employed
the claimant for at least one calendar year as a coal miner. If the first
operator "qualifies" as a responsible operator, the prior employers
avoid potential liability.'0 9
The Board expanded on the Director's responsibilities to identify
potential responsible operators in a second decision." 0 The Director
shoulders the burden to "identify, notify, and obtain evidence from all
of the responsible operators who may be liable in any given
claim.""' This duty includes a determination as to the ability of the
named operators to assume the responsibility and the capability for the
payment of any benefits awarded. The regulations mandate employer
compliance, providing for operators to assume either self insurance or
to obtain a policy of insurance."' The Director, as the administrator
of the Act, must "vigorously" enforce these provisions. 113 Contrary to
the view of the Director, there is no authority (absent a successor in
operations)" 4 to hold liable for the payment of black lung benefits
operators that happen to fall in line as the second, third, or more remote operator to have formerly employed a miner. Liability for these
claims reverts to the Black Lung Disability Trust Fund."' These decisions should cause better and earlier assessments of potential confficts regarding who the operator potentially responsible for benefits
may be.

109. Id.
110. Matney v. Trace Fork Coal Co., 17 Black Lung Rep. 1-145 (1993), appeal docketed sub nom., Director, Office of Workers' Comp. Programs v. Matney, No. 93-2379 (4th

Cir. 1994).
111. 20 C.F.R. §§ 725.410(b), 725.412 (1993).
112. 20 C.F.R. §§ 725.492(a)(4), 726.201 (1993).
113.

Matney, 17 Black Lung Rep. at 1-149.

114. See 20 C.F.R. § 725.493(a)(2) (1993).
115. Matney, 17 Black Lung Rep. at 1-149 to 1-150.
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VII. ATTORNEY'S FEES
A repeatedly problematic portion of the BLBA surrounds the fee
shifting portion of the Act. 1 6 The BLBA has no specific provisions
concerning attorney's fees, but incorporates the Longshore and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA) provisions."17 Those provisions shift the payment of attorney's fees to the losing party when a
claim is successfully prosecuted." 8 If the claim is ultimately denied,
an attorney representing a claimant is prohibited from collecting any
fee." 9
The fee is reviewed by the appropriate adjudicatory body to assure
the fee is reasonable. 20 Although contingent on prevailing, attorneys
representing claimants are now not allowed to include a risk of loss in
the calculation of the reasonable hourly rate charged. Risk of loss
multipliers are prohibited under fee-shifting statutes.12 ' While some
attorneys have sought and had received a premium for the risk of loss
in black lung claims, use of such risk of loss multiplier to enhance a
fee under a fee shifting statute has been questioned in other fee shifting statutes. 2 2 The Fourth Circuit has specifically rejected use of
23
risk of loss multipliers to enhance an hourly rate in black lung claims.1

116. The validity of the fee shifting portion of the Act has been confirmed by the U.S.
Supreme Court. U.S. Dep't of Labor v. Triplett, 494 U.S. 715 (1990); see also Robert A.
Campbell, Comment, U.S. Dep't of Labor v. Triplett: Black Lung Claimants Will Continue
to Suffer From a Lack of Legal Representation, 93 W. VA. L. REv. 713 (1991).
117. See 33 U.S.C. § 928 (1988).
118. 30 U.S.C. § 932(a) (1988) (incorporating by reference 33 U.S.C. § 928 (1988));
20 C.F.R. § 725.365 (1993).
119. The resultant strains of the contingent nature of representative's fees is discussed
by the Court in U.S. Dep't of Labor v. Triplett, 494 U.S. 715 (1990).
120. Triplett, 494 U.S. at 725; 20 C.F.R. § 725.366 (1993).
121. City of Burlington v. Dague, 112 S. Ct. 2638, (1992); see also Pennsylvania v.
Delaware Valley Citizens' Counsel for Clean Air, 483 U.S. 711 (1987) (four justices limiting risk multipliers).
122. Barrow v. Falck, 977 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir. 1992); Gusman v. Unisys Corp., 986
F.2d 1146 (7th Cir. 1993).
123. Broyles v. Director, Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, 974 F.2d 508 (4th Cir.
1992) (approving $43,000 in fees in a case that was presented to the Supreme Court and
approval for over $300,000 in fees was sought).
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VIII.

WHERE Do WE Go FROM HERE?

Various circuit courts have expressed open frustration and considerable2 4exasperation in addressing claims under the black lung pro-5
gram.1 In claims adjudicated under Part 718 of the regulations,"
the miner has the burden to prove 126 the existence of pneumoconiosis. The most common method to establish the existence of pneumoconiosis is by presenting x-ray evidence of pneumoconiosis 2 7
The BLBA provides that the Department of Labor shall, on request, provide to each miner who files a claim an opportunity to sub28
stantiate the claim by means of a complete pulmonary evaluation.
This requirement includes not only a physical examination, but laboratory testing of lung function and a chest x-ray. The Department of
Labor has the x-ray read by a physician with board certification in the
subspecialty of radiology or one that is certified as having expertise in
the interpretation of x-rays for pneumoconiosis. The parties in black
lung claims frequently have the x-ray taken in association with the
DOL examination or x-rays taken in association with pulmonary evaluations scheduled by the other parties reread by experts of their own
choice. In Woodward,19 the circuit court confronted the problem of
conflicting interpretations of x-rays by equally qualified experts. The
ALJ in Woodward was faced with resolving conflicting interpretations
of 8 different chest x-rays taken between 1975 and 1987. Of these

124. Grizzle v. Pickands Mather and Co., 994 F.2d 1093 (4th Cir. 1993) (Hall, J., dissenting); Woodward v. Director, Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, 991 F.2d 314 (6th
Cir. 1993); Adkins, 950 F.2d 49.
125. 20 C.F.R. Part 718 sets forth the criteria for the consideration of all claims filed
after January 1, 1982. 20 C.F.R. § 718.2 (1993).
126. See discussion supra part II for an explanation of the meaning of the burden to
prove.
127. The regulations provide x-rays are to be classified according to the ILO/UICC
classification system for pneumoconiosis. The ILO system provides for classification of
opacities under a graduated scale where 0/0 indicates no abnormalities, 1/0 a level of abnormalities consistent with a diagnosis of pneumoconiosis, and 3/3 an advanced case of pneumoconiosis. 20 C.F.R. § 718.103 (1993).
128. 30 U.S.C. 923(b) (1988); 20 C.F.R. §§ 725.405 to -.406 (1993).
129. Woodward v. Director, Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, 991 F.2d 314 (6th
Cir. 1993).
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eight x-rays, the more recent 30 had conflicting interpretations for
pneumoconiosis, three positive and ten negative. The eight x-rays had
been read a total of 38 times. At least seven of the 12 positive readings were sponsored by the claimant, the remaining 26 negative read" ' The ALJ resolved the conings were sponsored by the employer.13
flict, finding no evidence of pheumoconiosis. Faced with the ALJ's
solution, the court held:
This cumulative evidence inquiry also reveals certain policy flaws in the
adjudication of claims that typically operate to disadvantage Black Lung
Benefits Act claimants. First, experts hired exclusively by either party tend
to obfuscate rather than facilitate a true evaluation of a claimant's case.
Second, when one party is able to hire significantly more experts because
it has infinitely more resources, the truthseeking function of the administrative proceeding is skewed and indirectly undermined. Third, hiring armies of experts often results in needless expense. If such a system continues unchecked,
justice will not be served, while moneyed interests
132
thrive.

A dissenting opinion in an adjoining circuit voiced a similar frustration over BLBA claims:
The current norm is the contest of physician's reports. If this exercise
ever had a fresh, truth-seeking outlook, it has long since faded. Tell me
where the miner lives and the name of the respondent employer, and I can
make a pretty accurate guess as to who the various experts are and what
their reports say. I am not singling out one side for blame. Disability, or
33
the lack thereof, seems inevitably in the eye of the paid beholder.1

Faced with the
BLBA, both of the
system. Judge Hall
"tired, scandalously

frustrations over the observed shortcomings in the
circuits posited suggestions for the reform of the
suggests that Congress could seek to "fix" this
slow process. ' 134 The Sixth Circuit suggests that

130. The more recent x-rays being those taken in 1987. See infra part II for discussion
of "recent evidence."
131. Woodward, 991 F.2d at 316-17.
132. Id.at 321.
133. Grizzle, 994 F.2d at 1101 (Hall, J., dissenting).
134. Id.Reform legislation has been introduced in the last two sessions of the House
of Representatives, H.R. 1637, 102d Congress, 2d Session (1992) and H.R. 792, 103d Congress, 1st Session (1993).
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an ALJ not admit unduly repetitious evidence and seek "to have the
parties agree upon a predetermined number of experts to qualitatively
evaluate the x-rays taken, while sharing the costs of hiring [the experts].' 35 Such a procedure, the court suggested, would likely increase the fairness and reduce attendant costs.
The regulations and the APA provide the mechanisms for an ALJ
to control truly needless or unduly repetitious evidence scorned by the
courts.136 Moreover, the time lag in the decision making process
could be better controlled by the agency itself.137 Yet, due process
and the regulations' 38 dictate that there must be a fair hearing, which
must include the opportunity to oppose a claim and present evidence.
Attorneys defending these claims are partially at fault. When a positive
x-ray reading is offered and prior readings were negative, the x-ray, a
static piece of evidence, is passed from expert to expert in lieu of inperson cross-examination. When a claimant sponsors positive x-ray
readings and an employer's or the DOL's experts conclude that the
same x-ray is completely negative, frequently a group of rereadings of
the same x-ray are obtained to respond to the claimant's evidence.
Instead, maybe the experts should be brought to the administrative
hearing and demonstrate for the ALJ, with the ILO classification films,
why the x-ray is or is not positive for pneumoconiosis.
From the standpoint of a practitioner, 39 applicant courts are seeing the types of conflicts faced by lawyers on a daily basis. Instead of
suggesting a process to "obfuscate rather than facilitate a true evaluation, a "skewed process" or "a process directly undermining a
truthseeking administrative proceeding which allows moneyed interests
to thrive," the conflicts seen are those that spring from a legally defined disease. Coupled with the legal disease is the emotional baggage
attached to coal workers' pneumoconiosis. Unlike many diseases, a

135. Woodward, 991 F.2d at 321.
136. 20 C.F.R. § 725.455 to -.456 (1993); 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (1988) (exclusion of
irrelevant or iunduly repetitious evidence).
137. Ignored is 20 C.F.R. § 725.476 (1993), which provides that an ALT shall issue a
decision and order after 20 days of the termination of the hearing.

138. 20 C.F.R. § 725.452 (1993); 20 C.F.R. § 725.455(c) (1993); 5 U.S.C. § 556(d)
(1988).
139. The author represents several coal mine operators.
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healthy person Can experience breathlessness and imagine the agony of
such a debilitating illness caused by coal workers' pneumoconiosis.
Despite the improvements in the regulation of underground coal
mine dust, with the seemingly uncontested lessening of the degree of
pneumoconiosis experienced by coal miners in the United States, 40
miners continue to seek disability benefits under BLBA after retirement. The BLBA, presented as a pension program, unfortunately is
not. It is to provide disability benefits to miners, their dependents, or
survivors for pulmonary impairments that arose out of coal mine employment.
The contradictions in the legal as opposed to medical definitions
of pneumoconiosis,14 the 'failure to apportion a disability benefit
when a pulmonary impairment is due to multiple causes, and the apparent agreement category 1 radiographic pneumoconiosis is not gener42
ally regarded by informed medical opinion as a disease process,
and presents layers of contradictions and fictions which only serve to
frustrate those seeking black lung benefits. The federal program envisioned to be replaced by state programs has, after more than 20 years,
become a part of life for retiring coal miners, attorneys, and physicians
in the coal fields of the United States.
ADDENDUM

Just prior to publication of this article, the United States Supreme
Court handed down its decision in Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs v. Greenwich Collieries143 . A six-member major-

140. Michael Attfield, M.D., EpidemiologicalData on U.S. Coal Miners' Pneumoconiosis, 1960 to 1988, AMER. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC HEALTH, Vol. 82, No. 7, 964 (1992); Michael Attfield, M.D., Surveillance Data on U.S. Coal Miners' Pneumoconiosis, 1970 to
1986, AMER. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC HEALTH, Vol. 82, No. 7, 971 (1992); Marvin R. Balaan
et al., Clinical Aspects of Coal Workers' Pneumoconiosis and Silicosis, 8:1 OCCUPATIONAL
MEDICINE, STATE OF THE ART, THE MINING INDUsTRY 19 (1993).
141. Zimmerman v. Director, Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, 871 F.2d 564 (6th
Cir. 1989); Migliorini v. Director, Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, 898 F.2d 1292 (7th
Cir. 1990).
142. Stephen I. Richman & Carl J. Smith, Jr., Legal Aspects of Impairment and Disability in Pneumoconiosis, 8:1 OCCUPATIONAL MEDICINE, STATE OF THE ART, THE MINING
INDUSTRY 71 (1993).
143. 114 S. Ct. 2251 (1994).
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ity of the Court held use of the "true doubt" rule to resolve equally
balanced evidence violates section 7(c)144 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). In so holding, the Court affirms the decisions of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 45 and vacates contrary decisions issued by the Sixth 146 and Seventh' 47 Circuits. The APA and Black Lung Benefits Act (BLBA) are controlled
by a burden of persuasion requiring the benefits claimant to persuade
the trier-of-fact of the truth of a proposition by a preponderance of the
evidence. Reliance on "true doubt" violates this burden, by allowing a
trier-of-fact to resolve equally conflicting evidence in favor of the
benefits claimant.
Not only was the "true doubt" rule found to be afoul of the burden of proof set forth by section 7(c) of the APA, but also contrary to
the APA's general goals of greater uniformity of procedure and standardization of administrative practice. Had use of the "true doubt" rule
been allowed, the Court would have to defer to the Department of
Labor's reliance on marginally relevant and imprecise passages from
the APA's legislative history, opening the possibility of a multitude of
interpretations. Each federal agency would be free to decide which
party bears the burden of proof.
The Greenwich decision is not limited to cases arising under the
BLBA. Rather, this decision may be one of the more significant Administrative Law decisions to have been rendered in the last decade,
given the broad way the Court defines the issue. The majority provides
a hornbook-like analysis of confusion caused by imprecise language
arising out of the dual meanings of a burden of persuasion and a
burden of production attributed to "burden of proof." The "burden of
proof' as used by the Administrative Procedure Act is held to refer to
a burden of persuasion. The majority also finds a contrary footnote in
a prior Supreme Court decision 4 ' that cannot now withstand scruti144. 5 U.S.C. §556(d) (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
145. Maher Terminals v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 992
F.2d 1277 (3d Cir. 1993); Greenwich Collieries v. Ondecko, 990 F.2d 730 (3d Cir. 1993).
146. Skukan v. Consolidation Coal Co., 993 F.2d 1228 (6th Cir. 1993).
147. Freeman United Coal Mining Co. v. Office of Workers' Compensation Programs,
988 F.2d 706 (7th Cir. 1993), reh'g denied, 999 F.2d 291 (7th Cir. 1993).
148. NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 383, 404 n.7 (1983).
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ny. The Court's principal decision interpreting the meaning of section
7(c) 49 is reaffirmed, construing section 7(c) to set forth the burden
of persuasion not burden of production.

149. Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91 (1981).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol96/iss3/11

28

